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Thus, whether a defamation action is governed by the Federal

or New York State Constitution, the law under either is virtually
identical. Both state and federal law require an actual malice

standard when the plaintiff is a public figure. Similarly, the
public official plaintiff must demonstrate that the allegedly
defamatory statement is false. Further, only facts capable of

being proven true or false are actionable. Lastly, both seek to
preserve and protect "the cherished values embodied in the First
6
Amendment." 107
Prozeralik v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc. 1077
(decided November 23, 1993)

Defendant claimed that his right to free press under the
State 10 78 and Federal1 079 Constitutions was violated because the
trial court erroneously instructed the jury that retractions of

earlier broadcasts were false as a matter of law, and because
plaintiff did not prove that defendant acted with "actual
malice." 1080 In addition, defendant contended that the award of
punitive damages to plaintiff should be set aside "since there was

no showing of common-law malice; and that the damages award
[wa]s excessive." 10 81 The New York Court of Appeals
reversed, 1082 and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial
1076. Id. at 156, 623 N.E.2d at 1170, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 820; Immuno A.G.
v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 256, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1282, 566
N.Y.S.2d 906, 918 (stating that "the cherished constitutional guarantee of free
speech is preserved"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2261 (1991).
1077. 82 N.Y.2d 466, 626 N.E.2d 34, 605 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1993).
1078. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8, which provides in pertinent part: "Every
citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." Id.
1079. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states in relevant part:
"Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press .... " Id.
1080. Prozeralik, 82 N.Y.2d at 472, 626 N.E.2d at 37, 605 N.Y.S.2d at
221.
1081. Id.
1082. Id. at 470, 626 N.E.2d at 36, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 220. Although the
court of appeals reversed the appellate division's judgment, the reversal was
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court's jury instruction on the issue of falsity, "impermissibly
withdrew from the jury crucial interrelated issues of credibility
and actual malice that are solely [within] the province of the
factfmders." 1083 The court concluded that punitive damages were
not appropriate absent a showing of "common law malice." 10 84
The libel action arose when television and radio stations owned
by defendant broadcasted reports falsely identifying plaintiff as
the victim of an abduction and beating that had occurred the
previous evening. 10 85 The news reports also incorrectly stated
that the FBI was investigating the possibility that plaintiff owed
money to organized crime figures.1 0 86 Neither the police nor the
FBI had released the name of the victim, but during the
defendant's employee meeting and conversation about the
abduction, one of the reporters for Channel Seven News
speculated that plaintiff, John Prozeralik, a prominent Niagara
Falls businessman, may have been the victim because it was "the
first name that came to mind." 1087 According to Cindy DiBiasi,
defendant's news reporter, FBI Agent Thurston confirmed
Prozeralik as the victim, and told her, "You can go with that
unless I call you back." 10 88 Thurston, however, declared that he
never made such a statement, maintaining that he did not know
based solely upon the erroneous jury instruction. Id. Therefore, most of the

lower court analysis of the constitutional issues remained in tact. For example,
the court of appeals was in agreement with the appellate division's reasoning
that constitutional malice was the appropriate standard of review for a
defamation action. Id. at 474, 626 N.E.2d at 38-39, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 222. The
court of appeals, however, reversed the appellate division on the issue of
punitive damages, holding that a showing of common law malice, rather than
actual malice, was necessary to sustain a punitive damage award. Id. at 47980, 626 N.E.2d at 42, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 226.
1083. Id. at 470, 626 N.E.2d at 36, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 220.
1084. Id. at 480, 626 N.E.2d at 42, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 226.
1085. Id. at 471, 626 N.E.2d at 36, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 220. Plaintiff
Prozeralik and his attorneys notified defendant, owner of radio and television
stations, shortly after defendant's broadcast program, that plaintiff was not the
victim in the abduction story. Id. Furthermore, defendant verified that another
man, David Pasquantino, was the victim. Id.
1086. Id. at 470-71, 626 N.E.2d at 36, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 220.
1087. Id. at 471, 626 N.E.2d at 37, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
1088. Id.
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the victim's name at the time of the phone call and had refused to
confirm or deny any name. 1089 DiBiasi announced her story on
defendant's noon news broadcast, naming Prozeralik as a victim
of kidnapping and beating, possibly due to organized crime
debt. 1090 Furthermore, based upon the information obtained in
the television broadcast, WKLB Radio aired three radio
broadcasts which essentially repeated Channel Seven's
account. 1091
After the misidentification became known, Steven Ridge,
Channel Seven's news director, released a "retraction" on
defendant's two evening broadcasts, which stated: "The FBI
earlier today said and confirmed the victim was Prozeralik, but
our independent investigation is revealing he was not
involved." 1092 Prozeralik commenced a defamation action against
the owner of the television and radio stations shortly after the
broadcasts. Following a jury trial, and a reduction for financial
loss by remittitur, the Supreme Court, Niagara County, awarded
$15,500,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. 1093 The
appellate division affirmed, and defendant appealed. 1094
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the appellate
division's decision, holding that the trial court's jury instruction,
1089. Id. at 471-72, 626 N.E.2d at 37, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
1090. Id. at 470-71, 626 N.E.2d at 36, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 220. Anchorwoman

DiBiasi made the following news report on defendant's noon broadcast:
The FBI is investigating a beating and abduction in Cheektowaga last
night. Today, investigators are questioning John Prozeralik, the owner
of John's Flaming Hearth Restaurant, in Niagara Falls, New York.
Prozeralik was either tricked or forced to the Howard Johnson's in
Cheektowaga according to police, where he was beaten with a baseball
bat or pipe, and tied up. Today, the FBI is investigating the possibility

that Prozeralik owed money to organized crime figures.
Id.

1091. Id. at 470, 626 N.E.2d at 37, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 220. The defendant
broadcast the same report during its 12:45 p.m., 1:45 p.m. and 2:45 p.m.
news program on its radio station. Id.
1092. Id. at 471, 626 N.E.2d at 36-37, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 220-21.
1093. Id. at 472, 626 N.E.2d at 37, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 221. The plaintiff was
awarded "$5.5 million in financial loss and $10 million in punitive damages."
Id.
1094. Id.
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declaring defendant's retractions false as a matter of law, was
erroneous. 1095 By instructing the jury in this manner, the court
found that the trial court had usurped the jury's responsibility to
resolve issues of credibility1 096 and actual malice. 10 97
Determination of these issues, the court explained, "cuts to the
heart of the critical elements necessary to prevail in such
[defamation] cases." 10 98 The court concluded that because the

trial court "failed to tender to the jury its full range of fact
finding options," with respect to the telephone conversations and
the retractions, reversal was necessary. 1099 The court then
conducted an independent review of the evidence in the

1095. Id. The jury instruction read in part:
In the case presently being tried before you, I have determined as a
matter of law that defendant... made certain false statements about the
plaintiff ....This means that it will not be necessary for you to decide
whether or not the plaintiff has proved those elements of his libel case.
Id. The court of appeals found this instruction to be erroneous with regard to
the retractions. Id. However, the court did approve of the instruction with
respect to the original broadcasts. Id. at 473, 626 N.E.2d at 38, 605 N.Y.S.2d
at 222. Defendant did not dispute the fact that Prozeralik was not the actual
victim, therefore, the court stated, "there was no error in instructing that the
initial broadcasts were false as a matter of law." Id.
1096. Id. In the instant case, the court of appeals explained that the trial
court's instruction, in effect, directed the jury to completely ignore DiBiasi's
testimony, and accept the FBI agent's account of the telephone conversation
between DiBiasi and himself. Id. Thus, the jury was deprived of its duty to
decide which witness, Thurston or DiBiasi, was the credible one. Id. at 472,
626 N.E.2d at 37, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 221; see generally Dominguez v.
Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., 46 N.Y.2d 528, 534,
388 N.E.2d 1221, 1224, 415 N.Y.S.2d 634, 637 (1979) (stating that
"[a]ssessment of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses is a
function of the finder of fact").
1097. Prozeralik,82 N.Y.2d at 472, 626 N.E.2d at 38, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 221
(citing Bose Corp. v. Consumer's Union of United States Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
511 n.30 (1984)). The court of appeals recognized that one critical question
which the court deprived the jury of resolving was whether the defendant
"realized that [its] statement was false or... subjectively entertained serious
doubt as to the truth of [its] statement." Id. at 473, 626 N.E.2d at 38, 605
N.Y.S.2d at 222.
1098. Id. at 472, 626 N.E.2d at 37, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
1099. Id. at 473, 626 N.E.2d at 38, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
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record, 1100 and determined that although reversal was
appropriate, dismissal was not. 110 1
The New York Court of Appeals has recognized that the shield
of protection provided by the qualified privilege of free speech
may be defeated by either the common-law or constitutional
standard of malice. 1102 However, in reaching its conclusion, the
court of appeals in the instant case applied federal law, and relied
upon several United States Supreme Court free speech decisions.
For example, the court adopted the "actual malice" standard
developed by the Supreme Court in New York Times v.
Sullivan. 110 3 This standard, which has been enhanced by the
Supreme Court's subsequent decisions, 1104 requires that a public
1100. Id. at 474-75, 626 N.E.2d at 39, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 223. The court of
appeals explained that although courts are normally without the power to
disturb findings of fact and are restricted to review only the law, in defamation
cases courts have a "constitutional duty" to exercise independent judgment in
determining whether evidence in the record establishes actual malice with the
"convincing clarity required to strip the utterance of First Amendment
protection" guaranteed by the Constitution. Id. (citing Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at
511).
1101. Id. at 478, 626 N.E.2d at 41, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 225. Based on the
evidence, the court found that plaintiff had met the prima facie burden of proof
required to sustain the defamation action, because even had the jury been
correctly instructed, it could have found that defendant published the
broadcasts with actual malice. Id. at 475, 626 N.E-2d at 39, 605 N.Y.S.2d at
223. Since there was sufficient and convincingly clear evidence to warrant
submitting the case to the jury for its assessment of actual malice, the court
ordered a new trial. Id. at 478, 626 N.E.2d at 41, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
1102. See Liberman v. Gelstein, 80 N.Y.2d 429, 605 N.E.2d 344, 590
N.Y.S.2d 857 (1992). The Liberman court, recognized that the term "malice"
now has "dual meaning." It includes "ill will" or "spite" under the commonlaw standard as well as "knowledge that [the statement] was false
or ...

reckless disregard of whether it was false or not" under the

constitutional standard. Id. at 437-38, 605 N.E.2d at 349-50, 590 N.Y.S.2d at
862-63; see also Stillman v. Ford, 22 N.Y.2d 48, 53, 238 N.E.2d 304, 306,
290 N.Y.S.2d 893, 897 (1968) (noting that the qualified privilege protecting
speech is defeated if "defamatory statements were motivated by either 'actual
malice' or 'actual ill-will'").
1103. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
1104. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). According to
the Supreme Court in St. Amant, "[t]here must be sufficient evidence to permit
the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the
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official seeking to recover damages for defamation, first prove,
that the statement was false, and second, that it was published
with "'actual malice' - that is, with knowledge that it was false
1105
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
The majority in New York Times recognized protection for
statements that were not published with actual malice, thus
reflecting a "profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen... . "1106 In Harte-Hanks Communications Inc., v.
Connaughton,1107 the Court emphasized "that the actual malice

standard is not satisfied merely through a showing of ill will or
'malice' in the ordinary sense of the term." 110 8 Rather, as the
Court stated in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc.,1109 a plaintiff wishing to prove actual malice is required to
show by clear and convincing evidence that defendant knew that
her statement was false, or that she "subjectively entertained
serious doubt" as to the truth of her statement. 1110
The court also relied upon Mahoney v. Adirondack Publishing
Co., 1 1 1 1 a free speech decision based upon the constitutional

standard of "actual malice." 1112 In Mahoney, the court held that
plaintiff could not infer actual malice because the false
1113
publication was a product of misperception, not fabrication.
truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard
for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice." Id.
1105. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.

1106. Id. at 270.
1107. 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
1108. Id. at 666.

1109. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
1110. Id. at 511 n.30.
1111. 71 N.Y.2d 31, 517 N.E.2d 1365, 523 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1987).

1112. d. at 36 n.1, 517 N.E.2d at 1367 n.1, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 481 n.l. The
Mahoney court stated that the dispositive issue on appeal was whether the

plaintiff had proved by clear and convincing evidence that defendants published
the false assertions "knowing they [false assertions] were false or subjectively
entertaining serious doubts as to their truth." Id. at 37, 517 N.E.2d at 1367,
523 N.Y.S:2d at 481 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280

(1964)).
1113. Mahoney, 71 N.Y.2d at 40, 517 N.E.2d at 1369, 523 N.Y.S.2d at
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The Mahoney court determined that there was insufficient
evidence to support the jury's conclusion of actual malice because
plaintiff did not establish that defendant "knew the account was
false or entertained doubt as to its truth.' 1114 It was more likely,
the court explained, that the statements were a product of
misunderstanding. 1115 The court in Prozeralik stated that the
instant case was a "different" and "stronger" case than Mahoney,
and factually distinguished the two cases. 1116 In Prozeralik,
plaintiff presented direct evidence from which a jury could infer
"that the defendant knew or suspected that Prozeralik was not the
victim" of the attack. 1117 Moreover, FBI agent Thurston gave
testimony, which, had it been rightfully reviewed by the jury,
could have supported a finding that defendant published the
retractions with actual malice. 1118 Therefore, the court
concluded, dismissal of plaintiff's action was not proper. 1119
The court addressed defendant's remaining contention as to
whether punitive damages can be awarded absent "common law
1114. Id. at 39, 517 N.E.2d at 1368, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 483.
1115. Id. at 39-40, 517 N.E.2d at 1368-69, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 483-84.
1116. Prozeralik v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 82 N.Y.2d 476-77,
477, 626 N.E.2d 34, 40, 605 N.Y.S.2d 218, 224 (1993). In Mahoney, the
defendant published a story in the sports section of a newspaper which
proffered a reporter's account of a football coach "verbally abusing" his
players. Mahoney, 71 N.Y.2d at 36-37, 517 N.E.2d at 1367, 523 N.Y.S.2d at
481. The reporter based his story upon statements which he allegedly heard at
the game. Id. At trial, it was found that the coach had not uttered the words
attributed to him, although what he did in fact say sounded similar. Id. at 37,
517 N.E.2d at 1368, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 482. The court concluded that actual
malice could not be inferred from a mere misunderstanding. Id. at 39-40, 517
N.E.2d at 1368-69, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 483-84.
1117. Prozeralik, 82 N.Y.2d at 477, 626 N.E.2d at 40, 605 N.Y.S.2d at
224.
1118. Id. at 477-78, 626 N.E.2d at 40-41, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 224-25. In
partial dissent, Justice Levine, relying on Mahoney, reasoned that there was
insufficient proof to establish actual malice because even if a jury would accept
Thurston's version of the telephone conversation, there was not (based on this
record) clear and convincing evidence that DiBiasi could not have
"misunderstood" Thurston's version of what he told her over the telephone. Id.
at 483-84, 626 N.E.2d at 44, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 228-29 (Levine, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
1119. Id.at 478, 626 N.E.2d at 41, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
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malice."1120 The appellate division only required a showing of
actual malice for an award of punitive damages, despite the
contention proffered by both the defendant and dissenting Justice
Lawton, that "common-law malice" or "conscious ill will" was
necessary to sustain the punitive damage award. 112 1 The
appellate court relied upon the federal standard which was
developed by the Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch,

Inc., 112 2 and reasoned that an award of punitive damages may be
justified if "the evidence establishes defendant's indifference to

plaintiff's rights, manifested by a reckless disregard of the truth
or falsity of its statements." 1123 The court of appeals, however,
determined that "actual malice" under the New York Times
standard was not sufficient by itself to permit an award of
punitive damages. 1124 The court explained that "circumstances
of... outrage, . . . spite, ... fraudulent or evil motive on the
part of defendant" must exist to justify the public policy behind
punitive damage awards. 1125 The court concluded that although
there was no evidence in this record to support the inference that
defendant published the reports out of "hatred," "ill will" or

1120. Id. at 480, 626 N.E.2d at 41, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 225. The court
recognized that had a new trial not been ordered, the jury instruction on the
issue of punitive damages would not have been reviewed because defendant
had not objected to it. Id. However, the court noted its disapproval of the
instruction "so as to provide guidance on the new trial and to settle the issue
for future cases." Id. at 479, 626 N.E.2d at 41, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
1121. Prozeralik v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 188 A.D.2d 178,
185-88, 593 N.Y.S.2d 662, 667-69 (4th Dep't 1993).
1122. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Gertz standard states that in a defamation
action, involving a matter of public concern, punitive damages may not be
awarded absent a showing of actual malice. Id. at 349.
1123. Prozeralik, 188 A.D.2d at 185, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 667.
1124. Prozeralik, 82 N.Y.2d at 479, 626 N.E.2d at 42, 605 N.Y.S.2d at
226.
1125. Id. (citing PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 10 (5th
ed. 1984). For public policy purposes, punitive damages are intended to
remedy the "defendant's mental state in relation to the plaintiff and the motive
in publishing the falsity .... " 82 N.Y.2d at 479, 626 N.E.2d at 42, 605
N.Y.S.2d at 226.
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"spite," a different determination may be established during the
12 6
new trial. 1
Both the State and Federal Constitutions provide the press with
broad protection of free speech by requiring defamatory
statements to be published with "actual malice." Under the
Federal Constitution, only a showing of actual malice is
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages. However,
New York law, seems to require an additional showing of
common-law malice, finding "actual malice ... insufficient by
itself to justify an award of punitive damages .... 1127 Together,
these requirements not only reduce the "chilling effect" that large
libel judgments may have on the "full and unfettered expression
of ideas," but more importantly, 1128 these standards guarantee
that the "broad cloak of protection afforded the press under the
State and Federal Constitutions,... does not extend to the
1129
reckless and irresponsible infliction of injury by defendant."
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
Polish American Immigration Relief Committee, Inc. v.
13 0

Relax 1
(decided April 13, 1993)

Plaintiff, Polish American Immigration Relief Committee, Inc.
[hereinafter PAIRC], a Polish immigrant aid corporation, brought
suit against the magazine publisher and editor of "Relax," a
small-circulation Polish language magazine, to recover for libel
based upon the contents of a letter to the editor, and an interview,

1126.
226.
1127.
1128.
1129.
1130.

Prozeralik, 82 N.Y.2d at 480, 626 N.E.2d at 42, 605 N.Y.S.2d at
Id. at 479, 626 N.E.2d at 42, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 226 (1993).
Prozeralik, 188 A.D.2d at 186, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 668.
Id.
189 A.D.2d 370, 596 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1st Dep't 1993).
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